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Ankur Tulsian

Ankur Tulsian is a knowledgeable professional with a rich background in business and leadership.

He is currently serving as the General Manager at Careem and has previously worked at top organizations like McKinsey & Company.

An alumnus of prestigious institutions like IIT Bombay and Ashoka University, Ankur is well-versed in Leadership, Business, Liberal Studies, and Mechanical Engineering.

His educational journey includes studying at the University of Pennsylvania, Ashoka University, and IIT Bombay.

Throughout his career, he has held key roles such as Commercial Director, Platform Partnerships at Careem, Senior Engagement Manager at Mckinsey & Company, and various leadership positions at other companies like Inspired Track, Henkel, and Morgan Stanley.

Ankur Tulsian is a dedicated professional who continues to be a lifelong learner and regularly shares his insights and opinions on business and leadership.

Highlights

Mar 12 · linkedin

So many people are comparing what's happening at #svb to the 2008 crisis, that I wanted to demystify what's happening in simple terms, given my knowledge of banking risk at McKinsey plus understanding of global tech trends

First, what is SVB:

SVB has been the bank of choice for startups, given it's startup friendly approach and willingness to bank with int'l startups registered as Delaware C Corp (a very common legal setup if you're VC funded).

Other than being startup focused, SVB was a regular licensed commercial bank, subject to the same regulatory requirements around capital and liquidity as other modern banks that were defined AFTER the 2008 crises to prevent such failures.

In fact, SVB's balance sheet was very conservative vs. reg requirements as well as vs. peers. As of Wednesday, only 43% of loans they had given out were financed by deposits, vs ~80% for peers. 70-80% of loans were low risk (PE/VCs, Private Banks, late-stage companies), and investments were all in gov't treasuries & very safe assets. In short, it was quite adequately capitalized and had adequate reserves.

But then what happened?

2 triggers led to 2 actions that created a panic flywheel.

Trigger 1: The rapid FED rate hikes caused the bonds prices to fall, meaning SVB's investments lost a lot of value on paper. This normally isn't a problem if SVB did not need to sell those investments but here comes the second trigger

Trigger 2: Apparently as VC funding dried, new deposits at SVB started to slow down, but start ups kept consuming cash at high rates. Meaning, SVB was starting to face cashflow pressures, meaning they needed to start rebalancing their assets which is a normal banking practice.

Action 1: SVB sold off $21bn of investments at a lost of $1.8Bn (a <10% loss)

Action 2: Floated public offer to raise additional capital to further secure their risk

SVB announced both of these actions on Wednesday, which to the untrained eye looked like bad news, especially in the context of the macro climate. This triggered a domino effect where startups started to withdraw deposits from SVB creating a panic flywheel causing SVB to hit liquidity crunch and share prices falling. The regulators intervened.

What's next?

US FDIC insures bank deposits up to $250K for a customer, so startups will be able to withdraw up to that amount on Monday. For sums above $250K, details are less clear. Either SVB will be force-sold to a larger bank, or govt will backfill liquidity temporarily, but either of those could take some time. Meanwhile, VCs and PEs are considering extending bridge loans to startups to cover emergency needs such as payroll.

Given that the failure is triggered largely due to a panic bank run, and not a fundamental risk with the bank's balance sheet, the chance of a systemic crisis is very low. However, till more clarity emerges on frozen deposits, public markets may see some volatility, and start-ups might delay payments

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