Suggestions
David Sacks
Entrepreneur and investor based in San Francisco
David O. Sacks is a prominent South African-American entrepreneur and investor, best known as the co-founder and partner at Craft Ventures, a venture capital firm he established in 2017. With a career spanning over two decades, Sacks has played a significant role in building and investing in several successful technology companies.
Early Career and PayPal
Sacks began his career in the technology sector in 1999 when he joined Confinity, which later became PayPal. As the first product leader and COO, he was instrumental in developing key teams and pivoting the company's product focus. Under his leadership, PayPal went public in 2002 and was subsequently acquired by eBay.24
Founding Yammer
In 2008, Sacks founded Yammer, an enterprise social network that became one of the fastest-growing SaaS companies, amassing over eight million users within four years. Microsoft acquired Yammer in 2012 for $1.2 billion, marking one of the quickest exits in the SaaS industry.24
Craft Ventures and Investments
At Craft Ventures, Sacks focuses on supporting founders and investing in SaaS and marketplace models. He has invested in numerous successful startups, including Airbnb, SpaceX, and Slack, and has been recognized for his strategic insights in product development.234
Recent Endeavors
In addition to his work at Craft Ventures, Sacks co-founded Glue in 2021, a workspace chat company that integrates AI tools into communication platforms like Google Meet and Zoom. This venture aims to enhance productivity through AI assistance during meetings.12
Personal Life
Sacks holds a J.D. from the University of Chicago Law School and a B.A. in Economics from Stanford University. He is married with three children and is known for his involvement in various philanthropic and industry-related initiatives.34
Highlights
Are Small Models Really a Threat?
The Anthropic Fear Factory just released a new report warning that small models may be only months away from self-replicating across cheap IoT devices like off-brand Android TV boxes and smart ovens. They say such an AI worm would be hard to shut down since there’s no central kill switch.
We’ve gone from “The Terminator is coming” to “your toaster might kill you.”
But the experiments don’t support the dramatic headlines. They ran a 26B model across 15 $55 TV boxes at 0.39 tokens per second. The end-to-end test used emulated devices with deliberately open ADB ports, so the “hacking” step was trivial. The capable model often ran on a separate server. Agents were harnessed and told to propagate. This is not proof of autonomous rogue AI worms in the wild.
Nor is the threat even novel. Worms that do this without AI already exist. Mirai in 2016 scanned for default credentials and built massive DDoS botnets. Kimwolf has infected over two million devices, mostly cheap Android TV boxes, by hitting open ADB ports.
Small models don’t currently add much that matters on these targets. The bottleneck has never been figuring out the device. It’s the huge number of devices that ship with open ports, default passwords, and no patching. Traditional worms already exploit that at scale.
A practical attacker would use the best models available offline to design a better traditional worm, then ship the lean binary. You get the intelligence benefit at design time without dragging a slow, heavy model along with every infection. Embedding a weak model in the payload is the worse option for anyone who actually wants the largest, fastest botnet.
The timing of Anthropic’s latest scare campaign is hard to ignore. The day before, Brian Armstrong posted that Coinbase fine-tuned an open-weight small model (Qwen-3.5-9B) on proprietary fraud data. It beat frontier models, including Anthropic’s own Opus 4.5, while being faster and much cheaper. In testing it cut fraudulent transactions by about 30%.
This is the emerging pattern. For narrow enterprise workloads you don’t need a general superintelligence. You need a small specialist model trained on your own data. Cheaper to run, especially as compute gets tighter, and often better on the metric that matters. That is a direct threat to the frontier-company model of selling access to ever-larger general models.
Safety advocates should be welcoming this development. If the real concern is existential risk from ever-larger frontier systems — the ones that could theoretically do sustained autonomous R&D or become hard to control — then a shift toward smaller specialized models is the safer outcome.
Small models specialized on fraud detection or support tickets are not pushing the frontier. They are not in the category of systems that could become a new species. The theoretical loss-of-control risk is created by models getting bigger and more generally capable.
Safety advocates focused on those risks should welcome companies having a cheaper alternative to constantly scaling general models. Instead we get dramatic warnings about small models at the exact moment they are starting to take real enterprise share from closed-model companies like Anthropic.

Anthropic says it has reduced the data harvested from Claude in distillation attacks by around 90–99%. I congratulate them on this achievement.
It’s consistent with the point I made a few months ago (All-In Ep. 282): Anthropic, not the government, was in the best position to stop distillation of its own models. Once the horse is out of the barn, there’s limited value in after-the-fact government action.
At the time there was a major push in Washington to restrict open models on IP grounds. The threat looked serious enough that 50 companies — including Nvidia, Microsoft, Meta, IBM, Palantir, and Dell — published an open letter in defense of open-weight models. Jensen Huang promoted it in his first-ever X post. Nearly 200 startups sent a similar letter.
I argued that restricting open models risked removing the incentive for closed-model companies to solve the problem themselves — and could reward negligence by stifling competition while they continued collecting revenue from distillation. The administration did not impose those restrictions.
Now we see the result. Anthropic invested in defenses and they worked. Not every technical challenge is a reason to run to Washington for new regulation.

