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Kenji Kushida

Senior Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Kenji Kushida is a distinguished individual with a rich educational background and extensive experience in prestigious organizations.

He pursued his higher education at renowned institutions, obtaining a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, and holding multiple Bachelor's degrees in Economics, East Asian Studies, and International Relations from Stanford University. Kenji also attended The American School in Japan.

Throughout his career, Kenji has held significant roles in several esteemed organizations. He served as a Senior Fellow at both the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research. Additionally, he was an International Research Fellow at the Canon Institute for Global Studies and an Affiliated Researcher at the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE). Moreover, he contributed as a Research Scholar and a Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University.

Kenji Kushida's expertise and academic accomplishments highlight his commitment to research and analysis in the fields of Political Science, Economics, and International Relations. His diverse educational background and professional experiences have shaped him into a respected figure in the realm of global policy and economic studies.

Highlights

Aug 24 · linkedin

My new piece from Carnegie: "Kishida’s Legacy of Global Success, Domestic Distress"

Now that we're looking into the next chapter of Japan's leadership, I took a look at Kishida's fascinating contrast between internationally well-received leadership guiding Japan's international affairs and his incredibly low domestic approval ratings.

"From a global perspective, Kishida has seemed in many ways to be just the prime minister that Japan needed. He has been an even-keeled, mild-mannered, and personable leader, working steadily toward strengthening Japan’s international security ties and economic integration with global partners while avoiding the extreme or ideological positions that have historically antagonized its neighbors."

"Unfortunately for Kishida, some of the very traits that made him popular internationally also contributed to his persistently low favorability domestically. Kishida, who emphasized his skills as a good listener, is fundamentally a compromiser. He has held no extreme views and did not spearhead any potentially controversial or divisive initiatives such as constitutional reform. Being a compromiser may not have been a problem during times of relative stability, but Kishida has had the misfortune of steering Japan through international economic troubles such as inflation and several major political scandals. While the Japanese public clamored for more effective or deeper reforms to combat daily cost pressures from inflation and a weak yen, Kishida’s efforts seemed to be stop-gap measures. Facing political scandals, the public seemed to want deeper political reforms that Kishida was unable to deliver."

https://lnkd.in/guYJWKmC

Aug 1 · linkedin

(Japanese below)

A very informative piece from Nikkei Asia, with thanks to Tokyo-based Lisa Kim, who kindly quoted me extensively.

An important theme of my Japan work at Carnegie is that Japan is more open and more global than commonly thought. One facet of being open is that global cloud providers such as Amazon, Microsoft, and Google are deeply embedded in today's Japanese economy. Commercial services such as Youtube and Amazon Prime, and Japanese corporations using Microsoft Office are obvious, but even regional banks have adopted new core IT systems from Microsoft, and much of Japan's startup ecosystem is built on top of Amazon's AWS and Google Cloud.

This situation led to a flurry of Japanese reporting around a "digital trade deficit," with Japanese businesses and consumers paying massive sums to US IT companies -- enough that it might actually be adding to the various forces making the yen weak.

From a narrower view from within Japan, people often raise question: "Why did Japanese firms lose to the US tech firms in providing IT services?" Happily, I was able to help reframe this question, especially having just been in Europe, where many of the policy discussions are about how to regulate the US tech giants.

It's not just a "why did Japanese firms lose" issue, but rather, "why did the US, Silicon Valley model tech giants disrupt IT industries all over the world and become so dominant?"

I've done some previous work on this (link in comments), and much of it boils down to these companies building global platforms and achieving economies of scale (along with various technological and conceptual innovations) with massive investments into datacenters.

Neither Japan nor Europe developed major global platforms. My favorite Japanese platform, the mobile Internet services in pre-smartphone era cell phones, were wonderful but limited to the domestic market because they were provided by telecom carriers. In contrast, Apple and Android's platforms weren't dependent on particular carriers--they simply needed connectivity. This commoditized a lot of what carriers did, and that's another theme in understanding the US tech giants -- commoditization.

Anyway, a nice piece by Lisa Kim and her colleagues!

日本の「デジタル赤字」ついてNikkei Asiaの記事に引用されました。ちょっと前にデジタル赤字についての記事が色々出ていたのですが、大事な問題意識は「なぜ日本のIT産業が負けたのか」ということよりも、「なぜシリコンバレー・モデルのアメリカのテック企業がここまで圧倒的に世界のグローバルプラットフォームとなったのか」というフレーミングが大事だと思います。

負けたの日本のIT産業だけではなく、ヨーロッパもアメリカのテック企業のプラットフォーマーをどうやって帰省するべきかというのが大きな課題意識で、産業としては大敗した結果とも言えます。なので、やはりフォーカスはなぜこれらのシリコンバレー組が勝ったのか、ということです。

日本のiModeとその日本国内の競争相手はは素晴らしいプラットフォームの先駆者だと思いますが、プラットフォームはキャリアが提供していたので、グローバル展開もキャリア依存になっていました。でもアップルとかAndroidのプラットフォームは特定のキャリアには依存せず、ネットにさえ繋がればいくらでもグローバル展開ができたのが大きな違いの一つです。コモディティー化をする側がプラットフォーマーで、そのほかのみんながされる側になった構図です。

Kenji Kushida
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Location

Menlo Park, California, United States