Suggestions
Matthew Gream
Engineering
Matthew Gream is an accomplished business leader and advisor in the software technology industry with over 30 years of experience. He has a diverse background in internet and digital communications technologies, networking, telecoms, and broadcasting. His expertise lies in developing and delivering commercial product-oriented software in B2B markets, leading product technology functions, and managing stakeholder relationships in complex global environments.
Gream spent eight years at Google/YouTube as a senior manager and head of a pan-EMEA product technology function. During his tenure, he empowered the team to move fast, use their initiative, and take ownership of projects. He also interfaced and negotiated on technology with internal cross-functional teams and external strategic partners.
Gream holds a Bachelor's degree in Computer Systems Engineering from the University of Technology Sydney, a Master's degree in Art History from the University of Cambridge, and a qualification in Intellectual Property from London. He has also completed programs in Leadership and Finance at Google and startups at Antler.
Apart from his professional experience, Gream is civic-minded and has held multiple non-profit leadership roles. He is a private pilot of aeroplanes and is based in London W2.
In 2020, Gream founded Capability Blue, a software technology advisory and investment firm. Before that, he was the Principal at Performant Capital and the Treasurer of the United Kingdom and Ireland Section Executive Committee at IEEE. He has also worked as an Entrepreneur at Antler, Senior Technical Contract Manager at Google, Engineering Program Manager at Sensory Pathways 4 Kids, Senior Software Engineer at Cisco, and Lead Coder at Commodore 64 Coding Groups.
Highlights
As Engineers, we don't always end up in a corner desk, but we can work in the most amazing and unique spaces. This was my desk last fall.
Three cryptographers are gathered around a table for dinner. The waiter informs them that someone has paid, either one of them or the NSA. They’d like to know which, but maintain the anonymity.
So, each two of them generates and shares a one-bit secret, say by flipping a coin. A and B share 1, A and C share 0, B and C share 1. Thus, each has two bits in hand.
Then, they announce a single bit to all, either the XOR of the two bits if they paid, or the opposite if they did not. If none of them paid, A shares 1⊕0=1, B shares 1⊕1=0, C shares 0⊕1=1. If, say, A paid, then A shares ¬(1⊕0)=0.
Now, if the XOR of the announced bits is zero -- in this case 1⊕0⊕1=0 -- then none of them paid, so the NSA must have. If the XOR is non-zero -- in this case where A paid 0⊕0⊕1=1 -- then one of them paid, but which one is not disclosed to each other, nor to anyone else.
There are limitations and complications, but that is the essence of multi-party computation for anonymous communication.
David Chaum (https://lnkd.in/eQqagHXX) proposed this almost 25 years ago in his paper “The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability” (https://lnkd.in/ezvF6S5A). It’s a simple and elegant problem, and with enough perspective, I think this paper, and its author, will been seen as considerably significant.
(midjourney: "three dining cryptographers gathered around one table for dinner, high definition last supper style")
