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Ryan McGovern

Process Safety | Loss Prevention | Risk & Insurance | Energy Industry

Ryan McGovern is a professional in the field of risk engineering and process safety. He currently serves as the Director at Fíréanta, focusing on helping people solve problems related to major industrial accident hazards, incident investigations, process safety culture, and insurability of risks.2

With extensive experience in the energy industry, Ryan specializes in process safety, loss prevention, and risk and insurance matters.3 He has a strong background in technological development, having previously held positions such as Vice President of Technological Development and Head of Artificial Intelligence Development at H & J MEDICAL SUPPLIES.1

Ryan is actively engaged in sharing industry insights and knowledge. He regularly posts professional content on LinkedIn, discussing topics such as hurricane risks, asbestos liabilities, and risk management strategies.4 His expertise in risk engineering has been recognized in the insurance industry, with him being featured on "The Insurance Podcast" to discuss the future of risk engineering.6

Most recently, Ryan has been looking forward to new developments in 2025 with Fíréanta, indicating his ongoing commitment to innovation in the field of risk engineering and process safety.5

Highlights

Aug 13 · linkedin

Its nine years since the explosion and fires at the Unipetrol Litvínov ethylene unit at Chempark Zaluzi in the Czech Republic.  It was a telling example of a ‘chain reaction’ or ‘domino effect’ incident, with a sequence more akin to a Hollywood catastrophe thriller than to a typical process safety event.

Jul 30 · linkedin

20 years ago today, on 30 July 2004, a 70 barg gas pipeline near Ghislenghien in Belgium ruptured, resulting in an explosion and large jet fire. The human impact was severe - 24 people lost their lives (one of whom died in hospital 11 months later, having suffered from horrendous burns) and 132 were injured. The high number of fatalities and injuries was partially down to the fact that the gas cloud ignited almost 1 hour after the leak was first observed, and so a large number of firefighters, police and other responders were in the area at the time of the explosion.  Over €100 million worth of property damage was also caused, including the destruction of a nearby cardboard manufacturing plant.

The disaster occurred during the final stages of a car park construction project. This work had been declared to the pipeline operator, and one of their operatives had regularly attended the project site.  Nevertheless, the investigation showed that there were three deep gouges in the pipeline caused by mechanical impact during the car park groundworks.  There happened to be a pressure increase in the pipeline on the morning of the incident, which exceeded the available hoop stress at one of the long gouges on the pipeline where the remaining metal thickness was only 3 mm. 

A number of years back I was performing surveys for an operator who managed over 1,000 km of cross-country pipelines in Belgium, the Netherlands and the western region of Germany, handling materials such as naphtha, natural gas liquids, ethylene, propylene and vinyl chloride monomer.  The practices they employed to prevent third-party damage were excellent; weekly route inspection by helicopter, monthly inspection by foot, pipeline routes marked by numbered orange posts every 50 m, pipeline positions accurately mapped via inertial measuring units (IMU), regular letters sent to all 950 landowners who have a pipeline section on their property, and all excavation works near to the pipelines announced via a government-run online reporting system. 

Despite all this, they had numerous cases of third party damage.  In fact the last time I went to see them they had suffered two incidents in the Netherlands within a two month period, both of which resulted in losses of containment but - luckily - no fires.  Back in the 80’s they even had an incident where another gas pipeline operator accidentally hot-tapped a new connection onto one of their operating pipelines; you could barely make this stuff up…

The European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG) reports that 49.6% of gas pipeline failures were due to external interference - more than three times more frequent than corrosion-related causes - since 1970.  So if a buried pipeline system is running through third-party or public land, then you have to assume that it will be constantly under threat, as history has shown us time and time again that diggers and backhoes will eventually strike.

Fíréanta

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Ryan McGovern
Ryan McGovern, photo 1
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United Arab Emirates