Suggestions
Brian Fishman
Trust & Safety, Technology and International Security, Counterterrorism
Brian Fishman is the Co-Founder of Cinder, a software company specializing in operational tools for platform governance, particularly addressing trust and safety challenges. Before founding Cinder in March 2022, Fishman was the Director of Counterterrorism and Dangerous Organizations at Facebook, where he led efforts to combat terrorism and hate groups, achieving significant advancements in proactive detection and policy development. He also served as a Senior Fellow at New America since 2013. Earlier in his career, Fishman conducted research at the U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center, focusing on jihadi web forums and open-source intelligence.123
Fishman holds a degree from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and has extensive experience in counterterrorism and platform governance.3
Highlights
Hi folks, I have a new paper out with Brookings, entitled ‘Dual-Use Regulation: Managing Hate and Terrorism Online Before and After Section 230 Reform.’ https://lnkd.in/gieA3wDJ
I set out with a couple of goals in mind.
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To illustrate the challenges that will be raised by regulatory reform. I’ve argued elsewhere that I think reform is necessary b/c some tradeoffs should not be left to private actors to resolve. At the same time, regulatory reform could do more harm than good. The paper also points out that increased liability faced by platforms will be weaponized by partisan actors to pressure platforms. In Italy, for example, the neo-fascist group Casa Pound has used courts to challenge Facebook’s removal of its pages. Law is dual-use.
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To offer a brief history of terrorism & extremism online. This history is familiar to terrorism scholars, but rarely mentioned in tech policy discussions. If you’re talking about extremism online & don’t talk about vBulletin, Louis Beam, & Abu Musab al-Suri well… you should.
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To provide an operational perspective on what Trust & Safety organizations actually do. I suspect DC policy folks will find this bit too detailed and T&S pros may find this retelling too superficial. Friends, that’s sort of the point.
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To illustrate some of the challenges of making policy with AI. T&S teams are quietly canaries in the coalmine for broader challenges of utilizing AI to make consequential operational decisions in adversarial situations. This isn’t in the paper, but I suspect more T&S veterans will wind up moving into more traditional national security roles in government b/c of their experience in this realm.
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Conclusions. Platforms can’t be perfect. Strict liability won’t work. Regulation based on ‘knowledge’ creates epistemological problems. Congress should clarify rules about proscribed groups. Regulation should indemnify platforms & require transparency regarding disclosures to law enforcement. If the purpose of regulation is to prevent harm you can’t just set aside small platforms because a lot of acute harm manifests on small platforms. Regulatory disclosures should be built around platform “surfaces,” rather than revenue or MAU.
